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Abstract 
Discussions with Member States’ representatives at the European Union Offshore 
Authorities Group (EUOAG) have identified the need for sharing good practice concerning 
Competent Authority investigations to ensure better consistency of approaches. 
The JRC has therefore developed these guidelines for Competent Authority response and 
investigation of offshore incidents, based on its experience of undertaking advisory support 
for a number of Competent Authorities on inspection- and investigation-related issues, and 
the training course which it ran for Competent Authorities – in collaboration with the 
Romanian Regulatory Competent Authority for Offshore Oil Operations at the Black Sea 
(ACROPO) – in February 2019 in Bucharest, Romania.   
This guidance document is primarily aimed at those Member States with less mature 
offshore industries and investigation procedures, and should provide a common 
understanding about Competent Authority investigation responsibilities. 
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1 Introduction 
The blowout on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on April 20th 2010, whilst drilling the 
Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico, significantly raised worldwide awareness of the risks 
involved in offshore oil & gas operations. In addition to the tragic loss of eleven lives, the 
blowout released nearly 5 million barrels of oil into the waters of the Gulf, and is considered 
to be the world’s largest accidental oil spill from offshore operations.  
In order to ensure a high level of safety in the European offshore oil & gas industry, the 
European Parliament and Council subsequently published Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of 
offshore oil and gas operations (OSD), amending Directive 2004/35, obliging Member States 
to introduce implementing legislation covering wide-ranging requirements for safety and 
environmental protection during offshore oil & gas operations. Key obligations included the 
creation of national Competent Authorities to regulate such aspects for offshore oil & gas 
installations in their waters. Under the Directive, a fundamental role of a Competent 
Authority (CA) is to oversee compliance by operators and owners, including by inspections, 
investigations and enforcement actions.   
Discussions with Member States’ representatives from the European Union Offshore 
Authorities Group (EUOAG) have identified the need for sharing good practise concerning 
Competent Authority investigations to ensure better consistency of approaches. Although a 
workshop entitled “Offshore Accident Investigation and Reporting” was organised in 2015 
jointly by the JRC and the Department of Labour Inspection of Cyprus1, considerable changes 
have taken place since then, both relating to the set-up of new CAs with little experience in 
investigation activities, and to the publication of a guidance document2 on Commission 
Implementing Regulation 1112/2014.    
JRC has therefore developed these guidelines3 for Competent Authority investigations of 
offshore incidents, based on its experience of undertaking advisory support for a number of 
Competent Authorities on inspection- and investigation-related issues, and the presentations 
at the 2015 workshop. The guidance is primarily aimed at those EUOAG Member States with 
less mature offshore industries and investigation procedures, and should provide a common 
understanding about Competent Authority investigation responsibilities. These guidelines 
build on existing practises and approaches from EUOAG members. 
  
                                           
1
 See Training and workshop section on the website of the Virtual Centre of Offshore Safety expertise (ViCOS) - 
https://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/vicos/  
2
 See Guidance Documents section of the EUOAG website - https://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/node/11  
3
 These guidelines are complementary to two other sets of guidelines developed and published by the JRC – Guidelines for 
Inspection of Offshore Installations (JRC 112738) and Guidelines for the Assessment of Reports of Major Hazards (JRC 
107405) 
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The differences between EUOAG CAs, including their differing organisational structures and 
responsibilities, the variations in their working arrangements with other national authorities, 
different national legal systems, and (particularly) variations in relationships between CAs 
and their respective police/enforcement authorities, preclude the development of detailed 
and comprehensive pan-EUOAG guidelines on CA investigation procedures and practises4. 
There is no single “template” for an EUOAG CA investigation. However, there will be a 
number of common aspects within all CAs investigation processes, so these guidelines are 
structured to cover the following aspects: 
 The requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU in relation to CA investigations; 
 The purpose of CA investigations; 
 The selection of incidents for CA investigation; 
 The preparation for CA investigations; 
 Practical advice on how to conduct a CA investigation; 
 The use of appropriate analytical investigation methods/techniques; 
 Additional considerations when investigating high profile incidents; 
 Concluding a CA investigation. 
                                           
4
 These described variations do not affect CAs inspection and RoMH assessment activities as much, which is reflected in the 
different level of detail in the previous JRC guidelines (Footnote 3). 
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2 The requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU and the 
purpose of Competent Authority investigation 
The requirements for CA investigation activities are defined in various Articles of Directive 
2013/30/EU: 
 Article 8(1)(b) describes the range of functions that CAs are responsible for, and 
these include “overseeing compliance by operators and owners with this 
Directive, including inspections, investigations and enforcement actions”;.   
 Article 9(c) then requires CAs to establish policies, process and procedures for 
overseeing compliance “including inspection, investigation and enforcement 
actions”; 
 Article 26(1) requires Member States to “initiate thorough investigations of 
major accidents occurring in their jurisdiction”.  
Apart from the specific requirement of MSs to investigate “major accidents”5, the Directive 
does not prescribe how CAs should undertake their investigation activities. This provides 
Member States’ CAs with considerable flexibility about the range of offshore incidents they 
are empowered, or can choose, to investigate, and how such investigations (including their 
scope, depth, style, etc.) can be carried out6. However, the OSD clearly envisages that 
investigations are part of a CA’s effective oversight7 of operators and owners working in 
their waters, so the overall context of CA investigation work is clearly as part of securing 
compliance with the major hazard aspects of the Directive. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, EUOAG CAs have differing structures, responsibilities and 
ways of working, which means that the approach to CA investigations will vary. For those 
CAs where other public authorities could be involved with their offshore incident 
investigation, it is crucial that joint ways of working are agreed and adopted, and OSD Annex 
III 2(1) (d) emphasises that: 
“[…] where the competent authority is comprised of more than one body, (the 
CA shall prepare) […] a formal agreement establishing the necessary mechanisms 
for joint operation of the competent authority, including senior management 
oversight and monitoring and reviews, […] joint investigation, internal 
communications and reports to be published jointly externally”. 
A Competent Authority’s building block for investigation activities, whether undertaken just 
by the CA itself or in conjunction with other public bodies, will be the OSD Article 9(c) 
“policy, process and procedures”.    
 
                                           
5
 “Major accident” as defined in OSD Article 2(19).  
6
 Interestingly, the OSD does not even specify that it has to be the MS’s CA who should undertake the Article 26(1) major 
accident investigation, although the general consensus is that the CA is the most appropriate body to do this. 
7
 Further details on the context of CA effective oversight /compliance activities are given in Section 3 of the JRC Guidelines 
for Inspection of Offshore Installations (JRC 112738).  
BUT – What added value or purpose does a Competent Authority investigation bring, as 
operators/owners are also likely to be undertaking investigations of their own offshore 
incidents? 
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In a similar way to the fact that operators/owners will have their own internal layers of 
safety/environmental assurance which are in addition to whatever regulatory “inspections” 
are carried out by the CA, so operators/owners will have their own levels of internal incident 
investigation regardless of whether the CA deems it necessary to undertake a formal, 
separate regulatory investigation itself. The reasons for operators/owners conducting their 
own investigations include: 
 Investigation is an essential part of any Safety & Environmental Management System, 
part of the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle of management control. As such, 
operator/owners will need to specify their incident investigation policy and 
procedures within the RoMHs for their installations, which CAs assess and accept 
under the terms of the OSD before the installation can operate. Offshore installation 
operators and owners therefore need to have a robust and appropriate investigation 
process as part of their legal obligations arising from Article 3(1) of the OSD.   
 Investigation enables operators/owners to identify any remedial action from an 
incident and then take action to prevent any recurrence. This could include changes 
to processes, changes to hardware, or improvements in competence.  
 Investigation provides a mechanism for the operator/owner to learn wider lessons 
from incidents as part of continuous improvement, to be taken into account at 
installation, company or even industry-wide level. 
 Investigation can provide the operator/owner’s senior management with intelligence 
upon which to monitor and review health, safety and environmental performance, 
and provides information about whether the organisation is complying with its legal 
obligations. 
 Investigation after a significant incident demonstrates good company values to its 
workforce and stakeholders. 
 Investigation will also provide necessary information for company insurers. 
It is important to recognise that an investigation carried out by a CA will be different from 
that undertaken by an operator/owner for the same incident, as CAs investigate offshore 
incidents for different purposes. Although there could be some similarities in parts of the 
investigation process, the CA investigation is not a simple duplication of the work done by 
the operator/owner, as the CA will have different goals. The immediate purposes of a CA 
investigation will include: 
 To establish, objectively and independently, the facts surrounding the incident. 
The independent nature of a CA investigation is one of the key factors which 
distinguishes it from the investigation carried out by, or on behalf of, the 
operator/owner;   
 To objectively analyse the facts to identify both the immediate causes and any 
deeper, underlying causes of the incident;  
 To objectively assess what remedial action needs to be taken by the 
operator/owner to:  
a) prevent a recurrence; and  
b) to address any underlying causes;  
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 To arrive at an opinion about whether any breach of legislation within the CA’s 
jurisdiction has occurred, and by whom; 
 To determine the range of enforcement actions which are appropriate, and then 
to initiate such actions; 
 To prepare an independent, competent and appropriate investigation report.  
CA investigations will need to facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the 
incident, in order to ensure that any remedial actions (including enforcement) will properly 
reflect the incident causation. Therefore, CA investigation will need to go beyond identifying 
the more obvious, immediate causes (such as “wrong valve opened”) to explore the  
hierarchy of causation which includes the underlying causes (i.e. the less obvious system or 
organisational reasons for the adverse event, such as “valve marking unclear and the permit 
to work was vague”) and then the root causes (i.e. the failures from which the other failures 
grew, often remote in time and space from the actual adverse incident itself, e.g. “a lack of 
monitoring and oversight of the company permit to work systems, a failure to implement 
company training systems, and poor safety culture”). The CA remedial actions can then 
properly focus on resolving the fundamental causes of the incident rather than just rectifying 
superficial issues. 
The causes of offshore incidents will inevitable vary widely. However, experience8 has shown 
that certain broad categories are particularly relevant in offshore incidents. These include: 
 Inadequate hazard analysis and risk assessment; 
 Missing or inadequate operating procedures; 
 Inadequate or poorly implemented maintenance systems; 
 Sub-standard supervision and communication; 
 Inadequacies in permit-to-work systems; 
 Competence and training issues; 
 Equipment failure with a wide range of technical causes. 
The causes of offshore incidents almost inevitably involve some level of human error, but it 
is essential that causation goes beyond simplistic blaming the operator for a mistake, and 
instead addresses the whole range of human factors which are so fundamental for managing 
major hazard industries.   
The term “error” can encapsulate a wide range of human behaviour, and only by fully 
analysing this can the appropriate root causes be established: 
 Unintended Actions – Lapses or errors, such as omissions, whilst undertaking a 
familiar job. These are unlikely to be eliminated by training, thus the opportunity of 
this type of error having significant consequences should be designed out; 
 Mistakes – Errors of judgement, where a person does the wrong thing, believing it to 
be the correct action. Ensuring adequate training and levels of competence is the key 
element;  
                                           
8
 HSL Research Paper FP/09/21 “Underlying Causes of Offshore Incidents”.  www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/offshore-
incidents.pdf  
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 Routine violations – Deliberate deviations from a rule or procedure which, over time, 
have become the normal way of working for that individual or group of workers. 
These violations are often done with good intentions (“getting the job done”), but 
raise issues such as safety culture, supervision arrangements and auditing;  
 Exceptional violations – These occur in rare situations, such as an emergency, when 
the operator has to take actions to deal with unpredicted circumstances.  
Competence and training are key elements; 
 Situational violations – Violations brought about by factors relating to the work 
environment. For instance, ergonomic issues such as poorly marked or located valves 
leading to wrong isolation;  
 Malicious violations – such as vandalism. 
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3 Selection of incidents for CA investigation 
The Competent Authority's investigation process will start as soon as it is informed of an 
offshore incident within its MS jurisdiction. There are a variety of both formal and informal 
ways by which a CA will learn about an offshore incident: 
1. Reporting under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 1112/20149 
This Implementing Regulation (IR) takes forward Annex IX of Directive 2013/30/EU, 
and requires operators/owners to submit a report to the Competent Authority within 
10 days of certain events occurring on, or associated with, their installations. The 
purpose of the IR is to provide CAs with advance warning of deteriorating conditions 
of Safety and Environmental Critical Elements (SECEs) on offshore installations within 
their jurisdiction and to enable comparison of the performance of individual 
operators/owners and the industry, both within and between Member States. 
Therefore, whilst the IR was not devised primarily as an incident “notification” 
mechanism, it is one of the formal ways by which CAs will find out about potentially 
significant incidents associated with offshore installations within their waters. 
Although the 10-day notification period indicates that incidents may not be reported 
as a matter of urgency, it at least provides a “backstop” incident notification system 
to CAs. The details requested in the IR report require the operator/owner to have 
already undertaken a level of investigation themselves, so the IR report forms 
contain significant details about the incident itself10. 
2. Notification under Directive 2013/30/EU itself 
Art 19(9) of Directive 2013/30/EU requires operators/owners to notify the CA 
without delay, and within 24 hours, when “an activity […] poses an immediate danger 
to human health or significantly increases the risk of a major accident.”  Similarly, 
OSD Art 30(1) requires operators/owners to notify “[…] without delay the relevant 
authorities of a major accident or of a situation where there is an immediate risk of a 
major accident […]” Therefore, although the information coming from these two 
overlapping notification requirements in the Directive will be much less detailed than 
reports under the Implementing Regulation, their immediacy ensures that this 
mechanism ought to be the prime way whereby CAs learn about significant offshore 
incidents. 
3. Notification under Directive 92/91/EEC 
Directive 92/91/EEC, concerning the minimum requirements for improving the safety 
and health protection of workers in the mineral-extracting industries through drilling, 
also provides requirements for the reporting of some offshore incidents. Article 3.4 
of this Directive requires employers to “without delay, report any serious and/or fatal 
occupational accidents and situations of serious danger to the competent 
authorities.” Although the scope of Directive 92/91/EEC is somewhat different from 
that of the OSD (i.e., it does not cover environmental issues, and has a wider 
coverage of purely occupational accidents) it does provide another reporting 
mechanism.  Given that Directive 92/91/EEC considerably predates the OSD, in some 
                                           
9
 Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R1112  
10
 Non-binding guidance on the IR is contained in the “Guidance document on Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
No 1112/2014). See https://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/node/11  
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Member States it is administered by different public authorities to the CAs set up via 
the OSD. In such cases, it is essential that the various bodies cooperate to enable 
sharing of reports under 92/91/EEC and to coordinate investigation activity, if 
relevant.  
Notification by other means 
There are a number of other, less formal, ways whereby CAs will learn about the 
occurrence of a significant incident offshore in the absence of a report from the 
operator/owner/employer.  These include: 
 Media reports, for instance when an on-going incident is developing or when 
an investigative journalist brings a previously non-reported “historical” incident 
to light;  
 Via the CA confidential reporting mechanisms for safety and environmental 
concerns; 
 From other authorities, such as coastguards or aviation authorities.  
Whatever the route of such offshore incident reports, once the CA becomes aware of the 
circumstances it will need to make an informed decision whether to investigate it or not, 
regardless of whether operators/owners have undertaken their own investigation.  
Apart from a bona fide “major accident” as defined in Article 2, where CAs have no 
alternative but to instigate a thorough investigation, the OSD is not prescriptive about what 
incidents Competent Authorities must investigate. It is therefore within the discretion of 
each CA to decide what “non-major accident” incidents to investigate. It is recommended 
that each CA details the factors which will be taken into account when making such a 
decision within their investigation policy/process/procedures, bearing in mind that such 
decisions may subsequently need to be justified under public or stakeholder scrutiny. 
Consequently, the reasons which influenced the decision whether to investigate a particular 
incident or not ought to be clearly recorded, should involve suitable specialists (if relevant), 
and should be made in a timely manner.   
The flowchart in Figure 3.1 describes a suggested investigation decision-making process for 
CAs. Other factors could, of course, be added should a CA wish, and the “Consider 
Investigation” conclusion box could include the consideration of the availability of sufficient 
CA resources.  
Once a decision to investigate has been made by the CA, the type and depth of the 
investigation to be undertaken will need to be defined. Once again, the OSD is silent on how 
any investigation should be performed, so a range of investigation options are available to 
CAs, which include: 
a) A full CA formal investigation, with immediate response and offshore presence, with 
the potential for the CA to exercise its full enforcement powers if necessary; 
b) A full CA investigation similar to a), but with no immediate offshore visit. This may be 
appropriate for incidents which are less serious and lower profile, which could await 
the next planned offshore visit if that is reasonably soon after the incident;  
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c) An intermediate CA investigation, with objectives directed at ensuring remedial 
actions and learning lessons, rather than full exercise of CA enforcement powers such 
as prosecution; 
d) A monitoring investigation, reviewing the operator/owner’s own investigation before 
deciding on further CA involvement. 
It will be important that CAs have a clear process for deciding which type of investigation will 
be adopted, and ensure that all those involved are aware of that decision.  
 
Figure 3 1 Flowchart of investigation decision-making process 
There may be occasions in which offshore incidents which are reportable to the CA may also 
involve other Authorities. This will vary between Member States, depending upon factors 
such as the domestic legislative requirements, the legal powers and scope of the CA, and 
existing allocation of legal and oversight responsibilities between public authorities.  
It is highly likely that Aviation Authorities will be involved in investigating helicopter 
accidents on or near installations, with Marine Authorities also being involved for vessel 
collision or near-miss incidents near installations. Some CA jurisdictions also require Police 
Authority investigation when prosecution action may be appropriate (e.g. fatalities).   
If such other Authorities are likely to be involved in an offshore investigation, it is essential 
that the Competent Authority establishes good working relationships with them beforehand, 
and agree clear joint working procedures which reflect the objectives of the OSD to integrate 
regulatory functions relating to offshore installations into national offshore CAs, even 
though those CAs may draw on resources from one or more national bodies.   
The establishment of an agreed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between all the 
national authorities who could be involved in an offshore investigation is highly 
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recommended, with periodic “desk-top” exercises to ensure that those arrangements will 
work efficiently and professionally when called into action. 
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4 Investigation preparation 
A Competent Authority investigation can be complex, involve considerable resources and 
people, and last a long time. Its management is therefore crucial, and should follow normal 
project management principles and arrangements, and these arrangements should be 
detailed in the CAs investigation procedures.  
Once a CA has decided to investigate a particular offshore incident, the scope and initial 
objectives of the investigation should be defined by a Senior Manager and an Investigation 
Leader should be appointed. Although some smaller and less mature CAs may initially seek 
to rely upon staff from other public bodies (such as Labour or Environmental regulators, or 
specialist consultants), it is difficult to imagine the Investigation Leader (i.e. the 
investigation’s “Project Manager”) as not being a member of the CA.  
Experience has shown that CAs can maximise the use of their resources and time offshore by 
maximising their preparation onshore. The investigation preparation phase starts with the 
collection of all possibly available details about the incident. Offshore incidents are dynamic 
events, therefore following the initial “report” more information may become available as 
conditions of any casualties change, the operator/owner investigation identifies more 
information, and any recovery/remedial work progresses on the installation. It is therefore 
recommended that the operator/owner is contacted regularly for updates about the 
incident. The CA should also analyse its records for that particular installation and/or the 
operator/owner to identify relevant information, such as RoMH requirements, previous 
incident and inspection history, assessment of overall performance, etc.  This sort of data 
gathering could easily be undertaken by support staff.  
Based on this initial information and the investigation scope and objectives, the Investigation 
Leader should assess the resources required, select the investigation team members and 
secure any necessary specialist support.  
Investigation team selection should take into account the competence of potential team 
members and their specialist knowledge, and this should include any team members who do 
not belong to the CA itself. It is good practice to have at least two CA personnel in the team 
– often this can be sufficient in case of a straightforward incident.  
A meeting of the investigation team before any offshore visit is considered essential. For 
those Member States where other public authorities (for instance, Police, Coastguard, or 
Labour Inspectorates) could be involved with investigating the incident, the relevant 
personnel from those other authorities should also be included in the pre-investigation 
meeting. This expectation should be reflected in the previously agreed joint working 
arrangements which the CA has in place.  
The purpose of the pre-investigation meeting is to: 
 Agree/finalise the investigation scope and its objectives (which could, of course, be 
further modified as the investigation proceeds); 
 Ensure that all investigation team members, especially those who are not from the 
CA, are fully aware of the CA investigation policy/process/procedures;   
 Agree investigation team member responsibilities/tasks and lines of command;  
 Provide team members with familiarisation of process, layout, P&IDs, offshore 
management structure, systems, etc.;  
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 Devise an initial investigation plan, from available information, including the list of 
key witnesses to interview (and in what order), what key process data will be needed 
and what documentation is likely to be important; 
 Assess any health & safety risks for the investigation team; 
 Address any competency issues within the investigation team; 
 Ensure that all team members are aware of any restrictions in their powers as part of 
the CA investigation team, and the limits of their jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assuming that the investigation will require an offshore visit, it would be appropriate for the 
CA Investigation Leader to contact the installation’s OIM after the Investigation Team 
meeting to check on availability of key witnesses (shift/rota issues) and documentation, and 
to arrange logistics such as travel offshore (by boat, helicopter, etc.), availability of overnight 
accommodation on the installation, travel arrangements after the offshore trip, etc. 
Competent Authorities' standard equipment specifications for offshore inspection visits 
should be appropriate for offshore investigation visits as well. Typical contents would 
include inspector personal protective equipment (PPE) - such as safety helmet, hearing/eye 
protection, gloves, safety boots - offshore clothing, overnight wash bag, etc. A range of 
evidence equipment will need to be assembled for use when required offshore, such a 
sample tins, securing tags, statement forms, and evidence bags (all developed in liaison with 
the police/court authorities, if required), and any necessary laptops, cameras and chargers. 
Information such as the installation RoMH, copies of national legislation and any national or 
international standards which could be relevant to the incident could also be helpful. 
Finally, one last issue which CAs may wish to consider during the investigation preparation 
stage is the following: are there any issues of prior CA involvement with that particular 
INVESTIGATION COMPETENCE ISSUES 
Competent Authorities should to establish minimum investigation competency requirements for their 
staff and develop their staff to meet those requirements. Typical requirements include: 
 Knowledge of the CA investigation policy, process and procedures; 
 Good communication skills – active listening, emotional intelligence, etc.; 
 Awareness of relevant legal requirements;  
 Familiarity with offshore processes and standards, or ability to quickly understand; 
 Ability to use/understand analytical investigation tools; 
 Ability to work as part of a project team in a stressful environment; 
 Experience in legal processes – statement taking, evidence collection protocols, etc. As each 
Member State will have different legal systems, it is recommended that CA inspectors (and 
others who may be called to be part of a CA investigation team) receive briefing/training from 
their Police or Court Authorities on the exact evidence collection processes which are required. 
Those CAs who are likely to rely on persons from outside their own resources (consultants, other 
national regulators, etc.) will need to anticipate these competency requirements when setting up those 
arrangements, so that any training needs for those third parties can be identified and addressed.  
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installation which could potentially become significant during the investigation? These are 
inevitably sensitive issues, but it is preferable to have thought about them in advance rather 
than at the completion of an investigation where an operator/owner could criticise or shift 
blame back onto the CA or question the objectivity of the CA investigation.   For instance, if 
one inspector has had considerable, long-term involvement in the regulatory decisions for 
an installation which has now suffered a significant major accident, it could be sensible to 
involve a different inspector in the investigation team to ensure that the CA investigation is 
transparently objective.  
In any event, retrospective analysis to see how the CA’s processes and procedures have 
been implemented for an installation involved in a major incident, in order to capture any 
lessons for the CA, is normal good practise. It is expected that CAs will have agreed 
processes to respond to such issues.  
Preparing for the investigation of an offshore incident which is still ongoing is more 
complicated.  These additional factors are considered in detail in Section 8. 
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5 Practical considerations when conducting an investigation 
offshore 
Immediately after arrival on the platform, the CA investigation team should follow the 
normal installation safety briefing process and offshore administration arrangements for 
cabin allocation, muster stations, etc. This is especially important when the team includes 
persons from other authorities, such as the Police Authorities or Labour Inspectorates, who 
may have never been on an offshore installation.    
Experience has shown that it is then beneficial for the team to meet with the Offshore 
Installation Manager (OIM). The CA Investigation Leader should clearly explain the purpose 
of the investigation, its scope and objectives, the legal basis upon which it is being 
undertaken, and the role of the various team members. The OIM can then give the team an 
overview of the incident and update them about the current progress of the 
operator/owner’s own investigation.  
Although the CA may already have a provisional list of installation personnel they want to 
meet (from their analysis during the investigation preparation phase), this should be 
discussed with the OIM and any other key witnesses identified.  
A preliminary “agenda” for the installation investigation can then be agreed, with an 
indicative timetable for interviews, etc. (although there will inevitably need to be flexibility). 
Any necessary permits, such as for the use of cameras or entry into hazardous areas, should 
be arranged and a familiarisation tour of the installation undertaken if necessary for any of 
the team members. The Investigation Leader should also ensure that the team is allocated 
secure, private working space within the installation, as far as facilities allow.   
The OIM may suggest that the operator/owner and the CA offshore investigations are 
undertaken jointly, for instance to minimise disruption to the on-going installation activities 
by having joint interviews with relevant members of the installation workforce. CAs should 
be wary about accepting such an arrangement. It challenges the independence of the CA 
investigation, and the workforce may also be intimidated if their interviews with the CA are 
held in front of their employers’ representatives.   
It is important that the workforce on the installation are also informed at an early stage.  
After the initial meeting with the OIM, it is recommended that the CA investigation team 
meet with representatives of the offshore workforce to explain the purpose of their visit, 
discuss the scope and objectives of the investigation, give any necessary reassurance about 
confidentiality and CA independence, and commit to meeting the workforce representatives 
again as the conclusion of the offshore investigation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POINTS TO REMEMBER OFFSHORE 
 The purpose of the CA investigation is to objectively and independently establish the facts 
about the incident and its causation; 
 Keep to your overall investigation scope and objectives – no mission creep! 
 You may need to take enforcement action as a result of your investigation, so there has to be 
an element of formality in your approach; 
 People may be upset, stressed or worried – bear that in mind with your approach; 
 Record investigation decisions.  
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After the initial meetings and workforce consultation, the offshore investigation can start in 
earnest.  Again, there is no standard template for how such investigations should proceed, 
but it is sensible for the investigation team to first visit the scene of the incident, ensure they 
understand the process (via P&ID explanation and walk-through if necessary), and study any 
information volunteered by the OIM, such as photos, logs, maintenance records, copies of 
permits associated with the circumstances of the incident, etc.  
The investigation team should then meet with individuals on the installation who could give 
relevant information to help identify the range of causes of the incident – these would of 
course include those who actually witnessed the incident, those who were directly involved 
with the build up to the incident itself, and those who could give essential background 
information. The investigation team should have already decided on a sequence of 
interviews, and it is usual to start with the actual witnesses to the incident or those who 
could give the most direct account of the situation, before continuing up the management 
chain of command.  
When interviewing personnel offshore, CA investigation team members need to be sensitive 
to concerns from those workers. Given that the operator/owner’s own investigation team 
may have already interviewed all personnel, they may be unclear about who the CA staff are 
working for, and may not be aware of the powers and independence of the CA nor the 
purpose of its investigations. Offshore workers could also be upset due to concerns for 
fellow colleagues who were injured in the incident, worried about whether they will be 
blamed for the incident themselves, and unsure whether their discussions with the 
regulatory authorities will be kept confidential. Therefore, CA investigators need to be 
emotionally intelligent11 to these common concerns, spend time allying any fears and 
explain the interview process in order to maximise the cooperation they receive.  
Having explained the interview process and introduced all the participants, it is usual for the 
investigators to allow the individual to describe their “story” in their own way. During this 
initial phase of the interview, investigators take informal notes.  It is then for the interviewer 
to clarify and explore the information, and try to arrive at a definitive and clear version of 
the relevant information which that individual can provide.  
However, different EUOAG CAs have different powers – some are able to “demand” that 
interviewees provide a written, legal document or “statement” and sign as to its accuracy, 
whereas other CAs do not have such comprehensive powers and may have to rely on others, 
such as their police authorities. Therefore, CA investigation teams will need to be absolutely 
clear about any limit to their powers of obtaining “evidence”, and this should be addressed 
within the CA’s investigation process and procedures. However, the optimum approach 
should allow CA investigators to obtain a written, signed account from each witness12 about 
what they know. By having that, CAs can demonstrate that they have done as much as they 
could to ensure that the information upon which they base their investigation is accurate 
and verifiable, and therefore any investigation conclusions are robust. Should the CA 
                                           
11
 This is a key competence for CA investigators/inspectors. Training in interviewing techniques and approaches may be 
available from other Labour Inspectorates or Police Authorities.  
12
 Although one approach is simply to ask the individual being interviewed to draft their own version of the “events”, 
experience shows that a more comprehensive and relevant record of the information can be obtained when the written 
document is initially drafted by the CA inspector via a questions and answers technique, with the individual being given the 
opportunity to amend any part of the written document before signing as to its accuracy. Tape recording of interviews is 
another option.  
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progress to formal enforcement action, a formal statement may also be a key part of the 
legal basis for taking such action.   
There may be situations where there is the potential for persons being interviewed to have 
themselves committed a crime by breaching the Member State’s offshore safety and 
environmental protection legislation. This will be rare, and consideration should always be 
given to the human error issues which are discussed in Section 2. However, CAs should seek 
advice from their legal advisors or police authorities for the correct interviewing procedures 
to adopt on such occasions.    
The CA offshore investigation will amass information from a number of sources. Capturing 
information from offshore personnel via formal or informal “statements” is covered above, 
but other information will be captured directly by members of the CA investigation team - 
measurements, photos, note of discussions, etc. - and it is recommended that CAs have a 
process of recording this type of information in official CA notebooks for consistency and 
transparency. There could also be a range of other information/ evidence which may need to 
be secured as part of the CA investigation, ranging from paper documentation, information 
from computer systems, visual evidence such as photos, CCTV and videos, etc., and “hard” 
evidence such as equipment and samples.  
For the integrity of a CA investigation, it is crucial that such evidence is collected under 
robust procedures, so that it is correctly identified in the first place, kept secure and 
undamaged, and transparently prevents any unauthorised alteration or tampering.  
Common practises include: 
 For documentation, use transparent, tamper-proof evidence bags, with the provider 
giving supporting identification. The bag label should include such information as a 
unique reference number, description of document, date obtained, location, who 
provided it, and a signature of the provider.    
 With information contained in computer systems, IT specialists may be able to take 
an “image” of computer hard drives, although this may only be warranted in complex 
cases. Otherwise, printouts or downloads to CD/flash drives may be adequate, with 
digital material obtained in a form that cannot be modified (e.g., pdf).   
 For hardware, this would depend on the size and weight of the equipment 
concerned. CAs should preferably have the power to seize and dismantle equipment, 
or at least direct that something must be left undisturbed until further investigations 
can be carried out. Robust label tags can be used to identify hardware, with a unique 
reference number, description of equipment, date obtained, location, who provided 
it, and a signature of the provider. Where such equipment has to be removed from 
the installation, for instance to undergo further tests under the control of the CA, 
then there should be a transparent chain of evidence continuity to ensure that it is 
not tampered with or damaged in transit. 
 If it is necessary to take material samples (for example, the contents of fluid lines), 
these should be in sealed, leak-proof sample containers appropriately and uniquely 
identified. It is recommended that three samples are taken - one for analysis, one as 
an untouched reference, and one for the operator/owner.  
For most CAs, the evidence secured during investigations could eventually be used as part of 
the formal enforcement activity, even prosecution, thus the method by which evidence is 
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secured, recorded and handled will need to follow the appropriate legal procedures for that 
Member State. Once again, CAs should ask for assistance from their legal advisors or police 
authorities for the correct procedures to adopt on such occasions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigation is a dynamic activity, so the CA Investigation Leader will need to ensure that his 
team has the opportunity to regularly feedback to each other about progress with the initial 
lines of inquiry. It may be helpful in some cases for the investigation team to briefly use an 
appropriate analytical investigation technique (see Section 6) whilst offshore to help assess 
the information being obtained and to identify significant gaps and lines of inquiry.  
The CA Investigation Leader will need to keep the investigation flexible as new (and possibly 
unexpected) information becomes available whilst offshore, and will also need to formally 
capture additional lines of inquiry which can only be pursued when the investigation team is 
back onshore, for instance, with the operator/owner senior management.  
The more members of the team there are, the more important it is to factor in regular team 
meetings – even just during a coffee break – to keep everyone in touch with progress.  
At the conclusion of this initial phase of the investigation offshore, the CA Investigation 
Leader should review with team members that all necessary “perishable” information has 
been safely recorded or secured, and come to the conclusion with his team about whether 
any immediate CA enforcement activity is required before leaving the installation.  
The CA Investigation Leader should then review the status and progress of CA investigation 
with the OIM and offshore Management Team, explain any proposed enforcement action at 
this stage, and inform the OIM about any proposed continuation of investigation onshore 
and/or CA action. A separate meeting should also be held with employee representatives, to 
explain progress so far and the next steps. 
EVIDENCE COLLECTION SUMMARY 
 Use formal “notebooks” to record site information; 
 Be clear about your CA powers to obtain “evidence”; 
 If you obtain evidence voluntarily, record this fact. If you obtain evidence under your formal 
powers, make sure you follow your procedures; 
 “Bag, tag or label”!! 
 Catalogue exhibits, and cross-reference in statements; 
 Consider any issues of relating to the chain of evidence continuity. 
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6 Analytical investigation techniques 
Section 5 focused on collection of information. However, to become an actual investigation 
that information needs to be evaluated and analysed to identify the immediate, underlying 
and root causes of the incident. The process is iterative, identifying, gathering and analysing 
more data until such a conclusion becomes possible.  
As a consequence, it is most efficient to start analyses early with few data, and develop 
them as more data become available. 
 
 
 
In the initial stages of a CA investigation, expert judgement based upon the experiences of 
those in the investigation team can help considerably.  However, more formal processes will, 
almost inevitably, be required as part of a “quality” (competent) investigation to help 
investigators interpret and dissect the mass of detail that becomes available.  
A formal approach will also help to identify gaps in the information obtained so far, to reveal 
the investigators assumptions, and to demonstrate consistency and thoroughness.    
A wide variety of analytical investigation techniques are available. They allow investigators 
to achieve clarity about the events, their causes, what is known and where the information 
gaps are. Such methodical approaches lend robustness to the investigation and its 
conclusions. Structured analytical approaches also help the investigation team focus on their 
own decision-making, whilst at the same time enabling a shared understanding within an 
investigation team which provides continuity and facilitates review. On the other hand, such 
techniques do require extra work (although that is something that diminishes as 
investigators become more experienced in their use) and can produce complicated output.  
Analytical investigation techniques can be split into a number of broad categories: 
 Analysis of sequence. A prime example is ECFA+ (Events and Conditional Factors 
Analysis), which is a method for creating concise descriptions of incidents. It has the 
advantage of being straightforward to use and is relatively easy for novices to pick up 
the technique quickly. Investigators can use ECFA+ to help them organise facts about 
what happened and to spot gaps in their data, to deal with issues of “what, how, who 
and when” and to help structure further investigation and data gathering. The 
process is easy to communicate both within a team and outside, and therefore helps 
demonstrate reasoning and progress.  
 Analysis of barriers and controls.  Many methods incorporate this type of analysis 
within root cause identification, and one particular example is ETBA (Energy Trace 
and Barrier analysis), which is provides a method to meticulously trace unwanted 
energy transfers in order to identify all the barriers and controls, both present and 
absent. By focusing on safeguarding standards, it provides a method for identifying 
why barriers and controls were ineffective or absent.  
 Analysis of possibilities, the most common one being Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). These 
are often particularly helpful when evidence is not conclusive or where the causes 
BUT – How do CA investigators perform such an analysis of offshore incidents which often 
have complex causation? 
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are obscure. Again, a reasonably straightforward technique to understand and 
practice. 
 Analysis of underlying causes.  There are a variety of methods such as Control 
Change Cause Analysis (3CA), Management Oversight & Risk Tree (MORT), and 
HSG65.  These generally facilitate a multi-level analysis of the reasons from events to 
management of safety, often using pre-set questions to drive the analysis. 
Not all types of analytical techniques will be appropriate for a particular investigation or 
investigation team. It is crucial that the investigators using a particular technique are 
comfortable and competent with it. The method must also be suitable for the context of the 
incident and the goals of the investigative task. Some of the techniques, such as MORT and 
HSG65, have the advantages of being able to be applied in different intensities, ranging from 
covering just parts of the investigation through to the entire incident. Hence, the help that 
those techniques could provide range from a quick review of the investigation right through 
to an extensive analysis.  
Some investigation analytical techniques will be available from open sources13, and hence 
free, whereas others will be proprietary commercial packages. It is suggested that CAs 
consider the full range of techniques which are available, perhaps obtaining some “taster” 
training/experience to help decide which ones could meet their needs. The examples quoted 
above provide a broad range which may be helpful to consider in the first instance. Further 
information can be found in the paper “Investigation Tools in Context” published by the 
Noordwijk Risk Initiative Foundation14. 
                                           
13
 MORT, ECFA+ and 3CA  can all be accessed free via http://www.nri.eu.com/publications.html  
14
 “Investigative Tools in Context” Rudolf Frei, John Kingston, Floor Koornneef and Philippe Schallier,  
Noordwijk Risk Initiative Foundation, http://www.nri.eu.com/Tools~final.pdf  
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7 Concluding an investigation 
The length and complexity of a Competent Authority's investigation can vary considerably. 
Investigation of relatively straightforward incidents can often be concluded by just one 
offshore visit, whereas others will need further investigation with the operator/owner at 
onshore facilities, and maybe return visits offshore as the CA’s analysis of causation 
continues. Some incidents may require CAs to seek external specialist support, whereas 
others will be well within the existing technical competence of the CA staff. Certain incidents 
may also require forensic examination of equipment or IT systems, which can often be 
outsourced to national technical institutions, universities or commercial laboratories.  
Consequently, CAs should expect the time and resources for their investigations to likewise 
vary considerably, with some capable of being concluded quickly, yet with others taking 
months or, in the case of the investigation of high profile major incidents, even years before 
the CA will be able to conclude all of its related actions.  
The management of the ongoing CA investigation process therefore becomes a fundamental 
issue. These guidelines stressed that investigations should be undertaken along standard 
project management lines, so the Investigation Leader will have a “Project Manager” role to 
ensure the investigation team continues with progress and delivery of the investigation 
objectives after the offshore investigation phase has been completed. Keeping a diary to 
record progress each day can be a helpful practice for the Investigation Leader to aid regular 
reflection of what has been achieved and what is outstanding. Regular investigation progress 
reviews will also add benefit in order to: 
 Monitor pace of the investigation; 
 Continually assess resource allocation; 
 Advise on, and accept/change, investigation lines of enquiry; 
 Decide to curtail investigation, e.g. when no material breach of legislation are 
identified, any breaches are disproportionate to prove, or sufficient work has 
been done to achieve aims of the investigation; 
 Record key decisions. 
The timeline for a typical CA investigation process is summarised in Figure 7.1, with the 
actual times reflecting a significant and complex investigation. Investigation of simpler 
incidents could be concluded earlier, but the philosophy of a number of phases as shown in 
the figure, covering both the investigation process itself and its linked (and parallel) 
enforcement/remedial process, will still be applicable.    
Depending on the size/complexity of the CA investigation, evidence can become extensive, 
so evidence management issues must be addressed within the CA investigation process. It is 
recommended that CAs implement a robust evidence logging system and associated 
database, and use it for all investigations – independently of the size of the investigation. 
Documentary evidence may be under tamper-proof seals, so should only be disturbed under 
transparent controls to take working copies and duplicate files. The CAs secure evidence 
storage and evidence audit trail arrangements should satisfy that Member State’s own 
Court/Police procedures, including any evidence stored offsite with 3rd party investigators. 
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Figure 7 1 Timeline to conclusion for a typical CA investigation process 
Most CA investigations can be managed as part of the CA’s normal operational line 
management process, and the role of the CA senior management in the investigation 
process should be clear within the authority's procedures. For instance: 
 What is the role of CA Senior Management in “approving” investigation reports and 
proposed enforcement actions?  
 Does this cover all incident investigations or only certain categories, such as fatalities 
and major accidents? 
 What is their role in ensuring any “prior involvement” considerations (see Section 4) 
are captured and taken forward?   
Each CA will need to establish its own policy. In addition, high profile major incidents may 
warrant the creation of a higher level Investigation Board (for instance, including persons 
outside the CA itself such as its parent Government Department) to provide strategic 
direction/management.  
As the investigation nears its conclusion, CAs should also consider the use of Peer Reviews.  
For instance, Technical Peer Reviews of any particularly challenging or contentious issues 
proposed for the Investigation Report could further demonstrate the independence and 
competence of the CA investigation and ensure the investigation findings are as robust as 
possible. Similarly, an Overall Peer Review of high profile investigations could independently 
 25 
identify weaknesses for further consideration by the investigation team before the 
investigation is concluded.  
One of the more obvious outputs from a CA investigation is the investigation report. 
However, the mandated requirements in the OSD about the style/content of CA 
investigation reports for external audiences are very limited. Article 26(2) of Directive 
2013/30/EU only requires a “summary of the findings” of the CA investigation of any major 
accident to be sent to the European Commission, either at the conclusion of the 
investigation or conclusion of legal proceedings “as appropriate”.  
Member States are also required to make a “non-confidential” version of the findings 
publicly available, which can be a relatively short document15. In addition, Article 24(1) of 
Directive 2013/30/EU and Annex II to Implementing Regulation 1112/2014 require a report 
by the Competent Authority, but this is just a summary of the operator/owner submitted 
information, normalised to provide “easy cross-border comparison of data”, and therefore 
does not rely upon any information from CA’s own investigation. Neither does the Member 
States' Annual Report to the Commission (drafted in accordance with Article 25(1) of the 
Directive), which merely includes the Article 24(1) incident data and simple numbers of CA 
investigations carried out in the year. These arrangements are summarised in Figure 7.216.
 
Figure 7 2 Accident reporting and investigation requirements according to Directive 
2013/30/EU 
                                           
15
 For examples of such non-confidential findings documents, see http://www.hse.gov.uk/osdr/reporting/osdr-reports-
major-incidents.htm. Types of “confidential” information which need to be omitted would include the personal details of 
those involved and commercially sensitive information such as detailed description of the reservoir characteristics or 
proprietary equipment details.  
16
 This figure is from the Guidance Document on Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1112/2014. 
https://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/node/11  
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CA internal investigation reports are not mandated by Directive 2013/30/EU. So, their 
content and layout is left to the discretion of each Competent Authority and should reflect 
the purpose they will be used for, and to a great extent that will depend upon the level of 
the CA enforcement responsibilities/powers. For instance, if the Competent Authority needs 
to refer issues to their Police Authority to take forward any higher levels of enforcement 
such as prosecution, then the structure and contents of the CA investigation report will need 
to meet the needs of the Police and the prosecution process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competent Authorities have clear responsibilities under Directive 2013/30/EU for overseeing 
operator/owner compliance (including taking enforcement action), therefore part of the 
conclusion of the CA investigation process should include the selection of any appropriate 
enforcement options. The term “enforcement” is not defined in the Directive, but it can 
encapsulate a range of actions as part of the CA overseeing compliance role. These options 
include: 
 “Findings” or letters to operators/owners, for instance setting out the conclusions of 
the investigation and requiring certain actions to be taken to address the root causes 
of the incident and any potential breaches in legislation;  
 A directed Review of the installation RoMH (taking into account Article 12(7) of the 
Directive), an approach which could be particularly relevant where issues discovered 
in the CA investigation related to fundamental risk assessment inadequacies or 
covered a number of different but interlinked issues;   
 Formal procedures to require specific improvements; 
 Formal procedures to cease/prohibit certain operations; 
 Replace the operator, via the process of CA informing Licensing Authority, as per 
Article 6(4) of the Directive; 
 Instigation of prosecution of the operator/owner, contractors, designer, supplier, 
individuals, etc.  
The Competent Authority should use a transparent system for enforcement decision-
making, and such enforcement considerations are dealt with in more depth in the JRC 
Guidelines for the Inspection of Offshore Installations.  Figure 7.3 provides a summary of 
A SUGGESTED BROAD OUTLINE FOR A CA INVESTIGATION REPORT 
 Summary; 
 Introduction (Brief details of the installation, how the investigation was carried out, etc.); 
 A description of what happened; 
 The immediate and underlying causes of the incident; 
 Identification of any non-compliances/breaches of legislation; 
 Details of remedial action taken or required; 
 Consideration of formal enforcement actions; 
 Wider lessons for CA and/or the industry. 
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such enforcement expectations based upon an assessment of the risk and compliance gaps 
between the circumstances discovered by the CA investigation and good practice.  
 
Figure 7 3 Enforcement expectations with respect to level of findings of CA investigations 
Another aspect of the conclusion of any CA investigation is to consider whether any other 
non-enforcement actions may be appropriate. These could include: 
 Changing CA oversight/inspection plans for that installation or for other installations 
of that operator/owner in the light of issues raised by the investigation;  
 Amending priorities within the CA oversight strategy to address, on an industry-wide 
basis, issues of wider concern raised during the investigation; 
 Other lessons for the CA with respect to their oversight activities (there could be 
overlap with any “prior-role” inquiries); 
 Preparing CA guidance for industry on issues raised by the investigation, ranging from 
“safety alert” messages on CA websites to more formal guidance or industry-wide 
advice; 
 Sharing wider learnings from the investigation with the MS tripartite body; 
 Discussing learnings/experience with EUOAG and industry bodies. 
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8 Additional practical considerations when investigating 
major offshore incidents 
So far, these guidelines have assumed that the incident has been resolved and the 
installation is back to a safe, steady state by the time the Competent Authority starts its 
investigation. The investigation can therefore commence at the CA’s timetable and in a calm 
and measured environment. This is the norm. However, there will be, on very rare occasions, 
severe on-going incidents which will inevitably require CA investigation, yet the first priority 
of the Competent Authority will be its involvement in the response and recovery phase. 
Examples of these extreme “major accidents” include the Elgin blow-out in the UK in 2012 
and Deepwater Horizon in the USA in 2010. Such major incidents make any CA investigation 
more complex and different factors need to be taken into account.  
What distinguishes these major offshore incidents is their high profile and the complexity of 
the necessary CA response. Very soon after such an event occurs, it will be obvious that a CA 
investigation will be required, but the Competent Authority will also be having to 
immediately respond with its partners in the Member States' External Emergency Response 
Plan to address any (primarily) environmental issues, and also amplifying its oversight of the 
installation because of the inevitable significant changes which will be required (well kill 
activity, relief well drilling, material changes, etc.). Because of the inevitable high levels of 
interest and concern following such events, the CA activities, including the commencement 
of its investigation, will be conducted within a stressful, pressurised working environment 
for the Competent Authority (and others) and in the glare of publicity and political interest.  
Such events can also be very traumatic should there be a high level of casualties or 
significant oil pollution. Experience of such events, albeit very rare, has shown that they can 
be exceptionally challenging for those within the CA.  
Such events are typified by an intense period of frenetic activity by the CA, and then a very 
long and complex investigation phase within an environment of heightened scrutiny of both 
the CA itself and the associated effectiveness of the Member State offshore regulatory 
regime. It will be a resource intensive period, and the more CAs can try to anticipate the 
demands on them during such events, the easier it will be. Making early decisions on long 
term resourcing issues (such as taking personnel “off line” to concentrate on the 
investigation) is recommended.  
The initial stages of CA response and investigation can overwhelm normal management 
spans of control, so consider what command structure is most appropriate for the CA during 
such periods. One option which has been used is the Strategic (Gold) – Tactical (Silver) – 
Operational (Bronze) levels of command: 
 Gold command will be remote from any immediate response or investigation activity, 
to enable it to take strategic decisions and undertake senior political briefing, media 
and stakeholder engagement, etc.  It will inevitably be at least the Head of the CA 
level, but for smaller CAs it may be appropriate for it to be a small high-level group 
chaired by the Head of the parent Government Department. 
 Silver command is at the forefront of the day-to-day operational and investigation 
decisions, the CA figurehead within the External Emergency Response arrangements.  
It will report to Gold and set the tactical direction of the CA response, but will be 
screened from the higher level political and media pressures to concentrate on 
managing the developing situation. For smaller CAs, this could be the Head of the CA. 
 29 
Silver command could be the designated CA Investigation Leader, although that 
responsibility could be given to a Bronze command level. 
 There can be several Bronze commands, all reporting to Silver, and each responsible 
for specific aspects of taking forward the CA response or investigation.  
There will inevitably be demands on the CA to provide particularly close oversight whilst the 
operator/owner retrieves control of such high profiles situations, some linked to existing CA 
roles such as responding to well operation notifications for well kills or relief well drilling, but 
also stakeholder pressure to provide assurance that the operator/owner is complying with 
its RoMH during the recovery phase. Linked to this, issues of previous CA prior involvement 
will need to be addressed, therefore one option would be to create two distinct project 
teams with a “firewall” between them: 
 A CA recovery team, which will include the CA inspectors/specialists who are familiar 
with the installation because of their recent involvement with its regulation activities;  
 A CA investigation team which comprises CA personnel who have had no recent prior 
involvement with the installation and can therefore demonstrate complete 
independence during the resultant investigation process.   
For such very high profile and significant incidents (particularly when there are fatalities), it 
is highly likely that national police authorities will become involved. This may lead to two 
separate investigations, one under Police powers and the other by the CA under OSD Article 
26(1), with each investigation, albeit covering the same facts, having a very different 
character. Police authorities will have little technical knowledge and will tend to look for 
individual “criminals”. Conversely, CAs are as interested in taking action to prevent a 
recurrence and to learn lessons for the future as they are in attributing guilt, and will 
therefore concentrate on failures in management systems, and will be mindful that they will 
need to continue to deal with the company afterwards. These tensions are best overcome by 
establishing exemplary relationships between the CA and the Police authorities, based on a 
clear understanding of each other’s roles and responsibilities, and securing mutually agreed 
methods of working. 
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COMPETENT AUTHORITY AIDE MEMOIRE FOR MAJOR INCIDENT RESPONSE & 
INVESTIGATION  
 
 Major incidents can happen anytime! So, prepare in detail for such an event by identifying the 
worse-case scenario in your waters, plan your CA response to that, and practice it! 
 Your Investigation Policy/Process/Procedures should take into account the demands on the CA 
during the “response” phase.  
 Establish what Command and Control arrangements you will put into place during such major 
offshore incidents.  
 Pre-plan as much as possible - “grab bags”, check lists, aide memoires, contact lists etc. 
 Assess potential 3rd party support you’ll need, and secure call-off contracts. 
 Put communication arrangements in place for liaison with the media and your range of 
stakeholders 
 Sufficient “back office” support will be vital for media response, developing lines for 
politicians, administrative and IT support. Consider how this could be achieved at short notice 
 Consider the implications of long term resourcing for the investigation, such as taking staff 
“off-line”, providing deputies for periods of leave, cover for the “day job” etc. 
 Work on achieving excellent relationships with your External Emergency Response Plan 
partners, and their understanding of your investigation role/responsibilities 
 Similarly, work on achieving excellent relationships with your Police and other enforcement 
authorities and establish agreed ways of working during the investigation of such major 
offshore incidents 
 Practise your arrangements and assess your preparedness with in-house exercises and 
involvement during industry and External Emergency Response Plan exercises. 
 Ensure that your own staff health & safety considerations will be adequate during such 
events: 
o Risk assessments 
o Competency/training 
o Ability to follow operator procedures 
o Fatigue identification and management 
o Counselling facilities 
o PPE 
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9 Conclusions 
Throughout, these guidelines have acknowledged that there is no universal template for 
how EU Competent Authorities operate, as EUOAG members have a variety of organisational 
structures and responsibilities, variations in working relationships with other national 
authorities, and differing legal systems.  
However, the building blocks of a Competent Authority investigation of an offshore incident, 
as described in Sections 3–7 and summarised in Figure 9.1, will provided a common 
approach which can be adapted to suit the variety of EU Competent Authorities. 
 
Figure 9 1 The investigation process 
These investigation guidelines are primarily aimed at those Competent Authorities with 
limited experience of offshore incident investigation and who may have less developed or 
less established investigation procedures. More mature Competent Authorities should also 
find these guidelines of relevance, and they are recommended to review their existing 
investigation and incident response processes and procedures against the suggestions 
provided in these guidelines.  
Section 8 covers the different, but strongly linked, topic of CA involvement in the response 
and recovery phase for extremely significant offshore incidents prior to being able to 
commence a formal CA investigation.  It is based on experiences of responding to such very 
rare events, and will be relevant to all EUOAG Competent Authorities.  
In particular, the aide memoire (Page 28) can be used as checklist for Competent Authorities 
to quickly assess their own preparedness for such events. 
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